Following is the text of his Address, delivered Thursday, May 27，2010.

以下是他的演講內容，發表于2010年5月27日，周四。

When I was younger, I used to hear Harvard stories from a member of the class of 1885. Back then, old graduates of the College who could get to Cambridge on Commencement Day didn’t wait for reunion years to come back to the Yard. They'd just turn up, see old friends, look over the new crop, and have a cup of Commencement punch under the elms. The old man remembered one of those summer days when he was heading for the Square after lunch and crossed paths with a newly graduated senior, who had enjoyed quite a few cups of that punch. As the two men approached each other the younger one thrust out his new diploma and shouted, “Educated，by God.”

當我年輕時，我經常聽1885班的一位校友講述哈佛的往事。那時侯，那些可以 來劍橋參加畢業典禮的老畢業生們不會等到團聚年才重回學院。他們只是想回來時 就回來，會會老友，看看新朋友，并在榆樹下品一杯雞尾酒。這位老人回想起某個 夏日，當時他吃完午飯走向廣場時，路遇一名新畢業的師弟，此人已經開懷暢飲了 不少那種雞尾酒。當二人漸漸走近，新畢業的哥們亮出剛拿到的文憑，大喊一聲 “受過上帝的教育！ ”

Even with an honorary Harvard doctorate in my hands, I know enough not to shout that across the Yard, but the University’s generosity does make me bold enough to say that over the course of 19 years on the Supreme Court, I learned some lessons about the Constitution of the United States, and about what judges do when they apply it in deciding cases with constitutional issues. I’m going to draw on that experience in the course of the next few minutes, for it is as a judge that I have been given the honor to speak before you.

即使我手中有哈佛大學榮譽博士學位，我也清楚地知道，沒必要向全校的人高 呼，但學校的寬容的確讓我有足夠的勇氣站在這里說，以我過去19年在最高法院的經 歷，我學到了一些關于美國憲法的知識，以及法官是如何運用這些憲法知識進行案件 的裁定。我很榮幸能以一名法官的身份，在接下來的幾分鐘里向你們講述這些經歷。

The occasion for our coming together like this aligns with the approach of two separate events on the judicial side of the national public life: the end of the Supreme Court’s term, with its quickened pace of decisions, and a confirmation proceeding for the latest nominee to fill a seat on the court. We will as a consequence be hearing and discussing a particular sort of criticism that is frequently aimed at the more controversial Supreme Court decisions： criticism that the court is making up the law, that the court is announcing constitutional rules that cannot be found in the Constitution, and that the court is engaging in activism to extend civil liberties. A good many of us, I，m sure a good many of us here, intuitively react that this sort of commentary tends to miss the mark. But we don’t often pause to consider in any detail the conceptions of the Constitution and of constitutional judging that underlie the critical rhetoric, or to compare them with the notions that lie behind our own intuitive responses. I‘m going to try to make some of those comparisons this afternoon.

今天在我們此歡聚一堂的時刻，也正是國家公共生活中兩件與司法有關的大 事臨近之時：伴隨著審理案件速度的加快，最髙法院開庭期即將結束了；為填補離 職法官空缺而進行新的大法官提名的確認程序也接近尾聲。結果就是，我們將不斷 地聽到或討論到一種特別的批評，這種批評往往針對那些較具爭議的最高法院的判 決：這些批評說法院在立法，他們所宣布的憲法條例在憲法中根本找不到，批評還 說法院正在涉足擴大公民自由的司法能動主義。我們當中有許多人，我肯定，今天 在場的許多人的直覺反應就是，這些評論往往是文不對題的。但是，我們通常不會停 下來去思考這些批評言辭下隱藏的憲法概念以及涉及憲法的判決，我們也不會把它們與我們自己直覺反應的概念進行比較。今天下午，我要試著來做些這方面的比較。

The charges of lawmaking and constitutional novelty seem to be based on an impression of the Constitution, and on a template for deciding constitutional claims， that go together something like this. A claim is made in court that the government is entitled to exercise a power, or an individual is entitled to claim the benefit of a right, that is set out in the terms of some particular provision of the Constitution. The claimant quotes the provision and provides evidence of facts that are said to prove the entitlement that is claimed. Once they have been determined, the facts on their face either do or do not support the claim. If they do, the court gives judgment for the claimant； if they don’t，judgment goes to the party contesting the claim. On this view, deciding constitutional cases should be a straightforward exercise of reading fairly and viewing facts objectively.

對立法和憲法更新方面的指責，似乎是基于對憲法的某種印象和審理涉憲案件 的某種模式，這兩者結合在一起產生了此類批評。涉憲案件有時候是政府提起訴訟 說它有權行使某種權力，有時候是個人主張享有某種權益。原告援引這一條款，并 提供事實證據，以證明他所主張的那種權利。一旦所主張的權利被確定，就看這種 主張是否被支持。如果是，那么法院就判決給原告，如果不是，那么法院就判決給 被告。從這個角度來看，判決涉憲案件應該是一項很直接了當的工作而且是忠實于 憲法原文以及客觀的既定事實。

There are, of course, constitutional claims that would be decided just about the way this fair reading model would have it. If one of today’s 21-year-old college graduates claimed a place on the ballot for one of the United States Senate seats open this year, the claim could be disposed of simply by showing the person’s age, quoting the constitutional provision that a senator must be at least 30 years old, and interpreting that requirement to forbid access to the ballot to someone who could not qualify to serve if elected. No one would be apt to respond that lawmaking was going on, or object that the age requirement did not say anything about ballot access. The fair reading model would describe pretty much what would happen. But cases like this do not usually come to court, or at least the Supreme Court. And for the ones that do get there, for the cases that tend to raise the national blood pressure, the fair reading model has only a tenuous connection to reality.

當然，確實有些涉憲案件是可以用這種忠于憲法原文的模式來判決的。如果今 天有位21歲的大學畢業生向法院提起訴訟要求參加今年的美國參議員競選，對于這 種訴求只需簡單地通過此人的年齡就可以被駁回。根據憲法規定，參議員的最低年 齡為30歲，并解釋道這一要求是為了防止某些無法勝任的人獲選。沒有人會說這是 高院在制定法律，或者提出反對說年齡限制不是對于參選權的規定。運用忠實閱讀憲法原文的模式可以得出這個案子的判決結果。但這種案子通常不會出現在法院， 至少不會出現在最髙法院。而那些在最高法院審理的案件往往會使整個國家繃緊神 經，忠實閱讀憲法原文的判決模式很難在現實中使用。

Even a moment’s thought is enough to show why it is so unrealistic. The Constitution has a good share of deliberately open-ended guarantees，like rights to due process of law, equal protection of the law, and freedom from unreasonable searches. These provisions cannot be applied like the requirement for 30-year-old senators; they call for more elaborate reasoning to show why very general language applies in some specific cases but not in others, and over time the various examples turn into rules that the Constitution does not mention.

只要稍加思索就可以明白為什么忠實閱讀憲法原文的模式是不切實際的。憲法 中有相當多是特意設置的開放式保證，例如“正當程序原則”，“受法律平等保護 原則”，以及“免于不合理搜查的權力”等。這些憲法條文不能與“要求參議員必 須在30歲以上”這類的條款以同樣的方式執行，它們需要更加詳細的探究，說明為 什么同樣的一句概括性的語句適用于某些案件，卻不適用于另外一些案件；而且隨 著時間的積累，各種判例就形成了憲法原文中沒有提及的規則。

But this explanation hardly scratches the surface. The reasons that constitutional judging is not a mere combination of fair reading and simple facts extend way beyond the recognition that constitutions have to have a lot of general language in order to be useful over long stretches of time. Another reason is that the Constitution contains values that may well exist in tension with each other, not in harmony. Yet another reason is that the facts that determine whether a constitutional provision applies maybe very different from facts like a person’s age or the amount of the grocery bill; constitutional facts may require judges to understand the meaning that the facts may bear before the judges can figure out what to make of them. And this can be tricky. To show you what I’m getting at, I’ve picked two examples of what can really happen, two stories of two great cases. The two stories won’t，of course, give anything like a complete description either of the Constitution or of judging, but I think they will show how unrealistic the fair reading model can be.

不過這種解釋還只是蜻蜓點水。其原因是，憲法審判不僅僅是忠實憲法原文和 簡單的事實認定相結合，憲法必須用大量概括性的語言，以便在很長一段時間內都 能適用。還有一個原因是，憲法包含的各種價值觀之間不一定能和諧共處，有可能 互相對立。再一個原因是，某些用來判定是否適用憲法的事實與諸如一個人的年齡 或收銀條上的金額這些事實是迥然不同的；涉憲法案件中事實可能需要法官們事先 弄清楚他們想如何使用這些事實，先要理解這些事實所包含的意義。這點可能會比較令人費解。為了說明我的意思，我選了兩個真實的案例，兩個大案件的故事。當 然，這兩個故事絕不是對憲法或審判的全部描述，但我認為它們將展現出忠實原文 的判決模式是如何的不切實際。

The first story is about what the Constitution is like. It’s going to show that the Constitution is no simple contract, not because it uses a certain amount of open-ended language that a contract draftsman would try to avoid, but because its language grants and guarantees many good things, and good things that compete with each other and can never all be realized，all together, all at once.

第一個故事是關于憲法是什么樣的。它將表明，憲法不是簡單的契約，并不是 因為它使用了相當多合同起草者會盡量避免的開放式語句；而是由于它的文字賦予 并許諾了太多美好的東西，而這些美好的東西又彼此沖突，不可能同時或者一次全 部實現。

The story is about a case that many of us here remember. It was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on June 26，1971，and is known as the Pentagon Papers. The New York Times and the Washington Post had each obtained copies of classified documents prepared and compiled by government officials responsible for conducting the Vietnam War. The newspapers intended to publish some of those documents, and the government sought a court order forbidding the publication.

這個故事中的案例，我們這里許多人肯定還能回憶起來。它是著名的“五角大 樓文件案”。1971年6月26日，這一案件在美國最高法院開庭辯論。《紐約時報》和 《華盛頓郵報》各獲得了一份由負責指揮越戰的政府官員準備并編制的機密文件副 本。報紙打算發表其中一些文件，而政府要求法院下令禁止發行。

The issue had arisen in great haste, and had traveled from trial courts to the Supreme Court, not over the course of months, but in a matter of days. The time was one of high passion, and the claim made by the United States was the most extreme claim known to the constitutional doctrines of freedom to speak and publish. The government said it was entitled to a prior restraint, an order forbidding publication in the first place，not merely one imposing a penalty for unlawful publication after the words are out. The argument included an exchange between a great lawyer appearing for the government and a great judge, and the colloquy between them was one of those instances of a grain of sand that reveals a universe.

這一事件發生的很突然，而且一般案子從初審法院到最高法院都需要數月，但 這個案子卻在短短的數天內就從初審法院到了最高法院。事情發生的時間點正是公眾情緒髙漲的時侯，而由美國政府所提出的訴訟要求又是對言論和出版自由憲法原 則的挑戰最為極端的一例。政府表示，它有權預先禁止，即事先禁止出版，而不僅 僅是在非法出版行為做出之后再進行處罰。法庭辯論在一個為政府出庭辯護的偉大 律師和一個偉大的法官之間展開了，而他們之間的辯論正是知微見著的實例。

The great lawyer for the United States was a man who had spent many Commencement mornings in this Yard. He was Irwin Griswold, dean of the Law School for 21 years, who was serving a stint as solicitor general of the United States. The great judge who questioned the dean that day was Mr. Justice Black, the first of the New Deal justices, whom Justice Cardozo described as having one of the most brilliant legal minds he had ever met with. The constitutional provision on which their exchange centered was the First Amendment, which includes the familiar words that “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” Although that language by its literal terms forbade Congress from legislating to abridge free expression, the guarantees were understood to bind the whole government, and to limit what the president could ask a court to do. As for the remainder of the provision, though, Justice Black professed to read it literally. When it said there shall be no law allowed, it left no room for any exception; the  prohibition against abridging freedom of speech and press was absolute. And in fairness to him，one must say that on their face the First Amendment clauses seem as clear as the requirement for 30-year-old senators, and that no guarantee of the Bill of Rights is more absolute in form.

那個為美國政府出庭辯護的大律師在這個校園里主持過多屆畢業典禮。他就是 歐文格里斯沃爾德（Erwin Griswold),他擔任哈佛法學院院長達21年，期間還擔 任了一段時間的美國聯邦總檢察長。那天向格里斯沃爾德院長發問的那個偉大的法 官就是布萊克大法官（Mr. Justice Black)，他是羅斯福新政期任命的首位大法官，被 卡多佐大法官（Justice Cardozo)譽為他所見過的最杰出的法律人才之一。兩者關于 憲法的交鋒集中在第一修正案，包括大家耳熟能詳的句子“國會不得制定任何法律 ……剝奪言論或新聞自由。”雖然從字面上看，第一修正案禁止國會通過立法剝奪 公民自由表達權，該項權利保證可以被理解為用來約束整個政府，并對總統可以要 求法院做的事情加以限制。而對于其余的條文，布萊克法官宣稱也要從原文的字面 意思上解讀。當憲法說不允許，就表明沒有任何回旋的余地，禁止立法剝奪言論和出版自由這一要求是絕對的。為了體現對布萊克法官的公平，我們必須指出，第一 修正案的條文從字面上看就和要求參議員必須年滿30歲的要求一樣明確，沒有其他 人權法案的權利保證形式比這一形式更加絕對的了。

But that was not the end of the matter for Dean Griswold. Notwithstanding the language, he urged the court to say that a restraint would be constitutional when publication threatened irreparable harm to the security of the United States, and he contended there was enough in the record to show just that; he argued that the intended publications would threaten lives, and jeopardize the process of trying to end the war and recover prisoners, and erode the government’s capacity to negotiate with foreign governments and through foreign governments in the future.

但是，格里斯沃爾德院長并沒有就此打住。盡管第一修正案的文字表述已經如 此明確，他還是試圖說服法院同意,當言論的發表會給美國的國家安全帶來不可彌 補的損害時，禁止發表是符合憲法規定的。他指出歷史上有足夠的證據體現了這一 點；他論述道，兩個報社打算發表的內容會危及生命，損害政府試圖結束戰爭，接 回被俘將士的進程，并削弱政府未來與外國政府進行談判的能力。

Justice Black responded that if a court could suppress publication when the risk to the national interest was great enough, the judges would be turned into censors. Dean Griswold said he did not know of any alternative. Justice Black shot back that respecting the First Amendment might be the alternative, and to that, Dean Griswold replied in words I cannot resist quoting：

法官布萊克回應說，如果當國家利益遭受損害的風險很大時，由法院出面禁 止發表，那么法官就會變成審查員。格里斯沃爾德院長說，他也想不出來還有其他 任何選項。布萊克法官馬上反擊道，尊重憲法第一修正案就是其他選項，針對這句 話，我實在忍不住要對格里斯沃爾德院長的回應在這里引述：

“The problem in this case，” he said, “is the construction of the First Amendment. “Now Mr, Justice, your construction of that is well-known, and I certainly respect it. You say that no law means no law, and that should be obvious. I can only say, Mr. Justice, that to me it is equally obvious that “no law” does not mean “no law，” and I would seek to persuade the Court that that is true.

他說道，“這個案子的問題就在于對憲法第一修正案的解釋。”“法官大人，你對第一修正案的解釋是眾所周知的，我當然尊重。你說，不得立法的意思就是不得立法，這應該是顯而易見的。法官大人，我只能說，對我來 說，同樣顯而易見的是“不得立法”并不等于“不得立法”，我將設法說服法庭， 我的觀點是正確的。

“As Chief Justice Marshall said, so long ago, it is a Constitution we are interpreting.”

“首席大法官馬歇爾（Chief Justice Marshall )很久以前也曾說過，憲法由我們來 解釋……”

The government lost the case and the newspapers published, but Dean Griswold won his argument with Justice Black. To show, as he put it, that “no law” did not mean “no law，” Dean Griswold had pointed out that the First Amendment was not the whole Constitution. The Constitution also granted authority to the government to provide for the security of the nation, and authority to the president to manage foreign policy and command the military.

這個案子最終是政府敗訴，報道發表了。但格里斯沃爾德院長卻在與布萊克法 官的辯論中勝出。為了表明他所說的“不得立法”并不意味著“不得立法”，格里 斯沃爾德院長指出，憲法第一修正案不是憲法的全部。憲法還賦予政府權力，使其 提供國家的安全，并授權總統處理外交政策和指揮軍隊。

And although he failed to convince the court that the capacity to exercise these powers would be seriously affected by publication of the papers, the court did recognize that at some point the authority to govern that Dean Griswold invoked could limit the right to publish. The court did not decide the case on the ground that the words “no law” allowed of no exception and meant that the rights of expression were absolute. The court’s majority decided only that the government had not met a high burden of showing facts that could justify a prior restraint, and particular members of the court spoke of examples that might have turned the case around, to go the other way. Threatened publication of something like the D-Day invasion plans could have been enjoined; Justice Brennan mentioned a publication that would risk a nuclear holocaust in peacetime.

雖然他未能說服法庭,政府行使這些權力的能力將因為報紙文章的發表而受 到嚴重影響，法院也承認，在某些時候，為了保證格里斯沃爾德院長所提出來的政 府權力的行使，法院可以限制出版權。法院對該案作出裁定的依據并不是基于“不 得立法”的字面意思，即表示不允許有任何例外，也就是說表達的權利是絕對的。 持多數派意見的法官們的決定只是說，政府沒有滿足舉證的重任，拿出事實證據來 為自己要求的禁止發表作出辯解，個別法官還在設想一些可以讓政府贏得案子的情形。像諾曼底登陸計劃這樣的事情，如果報社要發表是會被禁止的；布倫南大法官 (Justice Brennan)還提到如果文章的發表可能會引起和平時期的核戰爭，那該文章 也可以禁止發表的。

Even the First Amendment, then，expressing the value of speech and publication in the terms of a right as paramount as any fundamental right can be, does not quite get to the point of an absolute guarantee. It fails because the Constitution has to be read as a whole, and when it is，other values crop up in potential conflict with an unfettered right to publish, the value of security for the nation and the value of the president’s authority in matters foreign and military. The explicit terms of the Constitution, in other words, can create a conflict of approved values, and the explicit terms of the Constitution do not resolve that conflict when it arises. The guarantee of the right to publish is unconditional in its terms, and in its terms the power of the government to govern is plenary. A choice may have to be made, not because language is vague but because the Constitution embodies the desire of the American people，like most people, to have things both ways. We want order and security, and we want liberty. And we want not only liberty but equality as well. These paired desires of ours can clash, and when they do a court is forced to choose between them， between one constitutional good and another one. The court has to decide which of our approved desires has the better claim, right here, right now, and a court has to do more than read fairly when it makes this kind of choice. And choices like the ones that the justices envisioned in the Papers case make up much of what we call law.

可見，即使是體現了言論和出版自由是和任何基本權利一樣至高無上的憲法第 一修正案，也不能達到絕對保證的程度。不能絕對保證是因為憲法必須作為一個整 體來解讀，當作為一個整體解讀時，其他價值觀就會出現，與不受約束的言論與出 版自由發生潛在沖突，比如保護國家安全的權利，和總統處理外交和軍事事務的權 力。換句話說，憲法的明文規定會造成各種被承認的價值觀之間的沖突，而這種沖 突出現時，憲法的明文規定又解決不了這一問題。出版自由是憲法明文規定的無條 件保證，而政府行使憲法賦予的權力也是絕對的權利。選擇往往是不可避免的，不 是因為語言是模糊的，而是因為憲法體現的是美國人民的愿望，就像大多數國家的 人民一樣，我們總是希望魚和熊掌兼得。我們想要秩序和安全，我們也要自由。此 外，我們還希望得到平等。我們的這些想要兼得的愿望會發生沖突，而當這種沖突 發生時，法院就不得不在魚和熊掌之間作出選擇。法院在作這種選擇的時候需要的 不僅僅是對憲法原文的忠實閱讀，必須決定哪一個價值在此時此地擁有更大的權利主張。而法官們在像“五角大樓文件案”中所做的選擇形成的判例，也成了構成我 們所說的法律的一部分。

Let me ask a rhetorical question. Should the choice and its explanation be called illegitimate law making? Can it be an act beyond the judicial power when a choice must be made and the Constitution has not made it in advance in so many words? You know my answer. So much for the notion that all of constitutional law lies there in the Constitution waiting for a judge to read it fairly.

讓我來做個反問。這種選擇和對這種選擇所作的解釋，能被稱為非法的重新立 法嗎？當法脘必須作出一個選擇，而憲法又沒有預先予以明文規定的時候，這能稱 得上是超越司法權的行為嗎？大家知道我的回答。這種認為所有涉及憲法的法律都 在憲法原文中，只是等待一名法官來忠實的按字面解讀的想法是頗有局限的。我們 先談到此為止。

Now let me tell a second story, not one illustrating the tensions within constitutional law, but one showing the subtlety of constitutional facts. Again the story is about a famous case, and a good many of us here remember this one, too: Brown v. Board of Education from 1954，in which the Supreme Court unanimously held that racial segregation in public schools imposed by law was unconstitutional, as violating the guarantee of equal protection of the law.

現在讓我來講第二個故事，這個故事不是關于憲法范圍內的各價值觀之間的 沖突，而是顯示出涉憲事實的微妙之處。同樣這個故事也是關于一個著名案例， 這里很多人肯定也記得：1954年的“布朗訴教育委員會案”（Brown v. Board of Education)，最高法院一致認為法律規定的公立學校種族隔離是違憲的，它違反了 法律的“平等保護原則”。

Brown ended the era of separate-but-equal, whose paradigm was the decision in 1896 of the case called Plessy. Ferguson, where the Supreme Court had held it was no violation of the equal protection guarantee to require black people to ride in a separate railroad car that was physically equal to the car for whites. One argument offered in Plessy was that the separate black car was a badge of inferiority, to which the court majority responded that if black people viewed it that way，the implication was merely a product of their own minds. Sixty years later, Brown held that a segregated school required for black children was inherently unequal.

布朗案結束了分離但平等的時代，其模式是在1896年的普萊西訴弗格森(Plessy v. Ferguson) —案中確立的，在那個案子中最高法院的裁定是，要求黑人乘坐被隔離的車廂這一做法沒有違反平等保護原則，因為黑人的車廂和白人的車廂從物理上來 說是同等的。普萊西案中也有法官提出的一個論點是，讓黑人乘坐隔離的車廂是讓 他們感到自卑的銘牌，但持多數意見的法官們回應道，如果黑人們這樣認為，這種 感覺只是他們自己大腦里的產物。60年后，布朗案則認為，讓黑人兒童去被隔離的 學校是一種內在的不平等。

For those whose exclusive norm for constitutional judging is merely fair reading of language applied to facts objectively viewed，Brown must either be flat-out wrong or a very mystifying decision. Those who look to that model are not likely to think that a federal court back in 1896 should have declared legally mandated racial segregation unconstitutional. But if Plessy was not wrong, how is it that Brown came out so differently? The language of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws did not change between 1896 and 1954，and it would be hard to say that the obvious facts on which Plessy was based had changed, either. While Plessy was about railroad ears and Brown was about schools, that distinction was no great difference. Actually, the best clue to the difference between the cases is the dates they were decided, which I think lead to the explanation for their divergent results.

對于那些認為憲法審判只是忠實閱讀憲法原文語句并運用到客觀公正的事實上的 人來說，布朗案肯定要么是個徹底的錯誤，要么是一種詭異的判決。他們也不太可能 認為聯邦法院在1896年就宣布這種法律授權的種族隔離行為是違憲的。但是，如果普 萊西案沒有錯的話，為什么布朗案的審判結果會如此截然不同呢？憲法中關于公民擁 有受平等法律保護的權利的語句在1896年至1954年間并沒有改變，要i兌普萊西案中顯 而易見的事實發生了改變，似乎也很難說得通。普萊西案是關于火車車廂，而布朗 案則是關于學校的，這沒有太大區別。其實，兩個案件之間的區別最好的解釋是它 們判決的時代不同，我認為時代的不同可以很好的解釋它們判決結果的不同。

As I’ve said elsewhere, the members of the Court in Plessy remembered the day when human slavery was the law in much of the land. To that generation, the formal equality of an identical railroad car meant progress. But the generation in power in 1954 looked at enforced separation without the revolting background of slavery to make it look unexceptional by contrast. As a consequence, the judges of 1954 found a meaning in segregating the races by law that the majority of their predecessors in 1896 did not see. That meaning is not captured by descriptions of physically identical schools or physically identical railroad cars. The meaning of facts arises elsewhere, and its judicial perception turns on the experience of the judges, and on their ability to think from a point of view different from their own. Meaning comes from the capacity .to see what is not in some simple, objective sense there on the printed page. And when the judges in 1954 read the record of enforced segregation it carried only one possible meaning: It expressed a judgment of inherent inferiority on the part of the minority race. The judges who understood the meaning that was apparent in 1954 would have violated their oaths to uphold the Constitution if they had not held the segregation mandate unconstitutional.

我在其他場合也曾經這樣說過，在普萊西案中，法院法官們想到的是，曾經在 美國的很多州，法律還允許奴隸的存在。在他們那個時代，黑人享有和白人同樣的火車車廂已經意味著進步了。然而到了 1954年，法官們已經沒有了奴隸制這樣的強 烈對照背景，法律強制的種族隔離就不是等閑之事了。結果，1954年的法官們從種 族隔離中看到了某種意義，而在1896年持多數人意見的前輩們卻并沒有看到。那個 意義并不包含在物理上相同的學校，或物理上相同的車廂的描述中。這些事實所包 含的意義源自其他方面，其司法感知取決于法官們的經驗，以及他們從不同觀點角 度來進行思考的能力。需要法官們的運用自己的洞察力去解讀這些并沒有通過白紙 黑字簡單而客觀的書寫出來的意義。所以當1954年的大法官們了解到了法律強制的 種族隔離行為，這個事實只包含了一種可能的意義：這種做法傳達出了對少數族裔 人先天低人一等的判斷。法官們只要認識到這點在1954年顯而易見的意義，又沒有 把這種種族隔離政策判斷為違憲，那就可以說背叛了他們維護憲法的誓言。

Again, a rhetorical question. Did the judges of 1954 cross some limit of legitimacy into law making by stating a conclusion that you will not find written in the Constitution? Was it activism to act based on the current meaning of facts that at a purely objective level were about the same as Plessy’s facts 60 years before? Again, you know my answer. So much for the assumption that facts just lie there waiting for an objective judge to view them.
 

讓我再做一次反問。1954年的大法官們有沒有越過合法性的紅線，用你們在憲 法中根本找不到條文的書面結論來立新法呢？基于事實的當下意義來判案，是不是 司法能動主義呢？要知道該事實與60年前普萊西案的事實在純粹客觀的角度來看是 完全一樣的。同樣，你知道我的回答。這種認為事實就在那里，只是等待一個公正 的法官來察看的概念是很局限的。
 

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