ALREADY THERE'S a bustling market in Germany and London for unrated death bonds―that is, ones that aren't graded by big ratings agencies such as Moody's Investors Service （MCO ） or Standard & Poor's （which, like BusinessWeek, is a unit of The McGraw-Hill Companies （MHP ））. So far there have been only two small rated deals in the U.S. But given how aggressively the banks are stockpiling life settlements, most market watchers expect big, rated deals to become commonplace soon, at which point mutual funds can dive in. "The product just lends itself to securitizations, like what has been done with mortgage-backed securities," says Philippe Hatstadt, who heads the new "longevity derivatives" group at Bear Stearns & Co （BSC ）. Cantor Fitzgerald, one of Wall Street's savviest bond-trading shops, is rolling out an electronic trading platform for life settlements and, ultimately, death bonds. The LexNet platform has been in the works for more than a year and is a major priority inside Cantor, say insiders.

　　But the push into increasingly complicated securitizations carries with it ever greater risk. That's what Wall Street is dealing with now as bonds backed by pools of subprime mortgages blow up left and right. A surge in defaults on these riskiest of loans is battering the hedge funds that invested―and the banks that arranged, packaged, and sold them. In June, two Bear Stearns hedge funds that bet on bonds backed by subprime loans collapsed, sparking panic on Wall Street about the health of other risky investments. Tavakoli says the same kinds of missteps are bound to happen with death bonds. But Wall Street is good at justifying its moves into new lines of business, however iffy they might seem, notes Kenneth C. Froewiss, a professor of finance at New York University's Stern School of Business and a former JPMorgan Chase & Co. （JPM ） investment banker: "At the end of the day, what Wall Street does best is figuring out what investors might want and structuring products to meet those needs." And its own needs.

　　That's not to say it isn't aware of appearances. Wall Street is doing its best both to polish the life settlement industry's image and to downplay its own direct involvement. The New York conference was put on by the Life Insurance Settlement Assn. （LISA）, an organization of market players that began as the Viatical Association of America in 1994, changed its name to the Viatical & Life Settlement Assn. in 2000, and then dropped the "viatical" altogether three years ago. In an attempt to put even more distance between Wall Street and the old viatical crowd, six investment houses, including Bear Stearns, Credit Suisse （CS ）, Goldman Sachs （GS ）, and UBS, in March formed a trade group called the Institutional Life Markets Assn. to lobby for "best practices" and "appropriate regulation."

　　Until some degree of legitimacy is in place, firms will keep as low a profile as possible. Goldman Sachs, for example, came close last year to acquiring San Diego's Life Settlement Solutions Inc., a large provider, but backed out at the last minute, according to people familiar with the potential deal. Instead, Goldman, which declined to comment for this story, is quietly building up its own subsidiary under the nondescript name Eastport Capital. That unit sent four representatives to the LISA conference.

　　It's no wonder that Wall Street is simultaneously attracted and cautious. The alchemy going on in the finance labs is real, but the market for life settlements is deeply troubled. There's a persistent problem with brokers offering lowball prices and failing to disclose transaction costs. The marketing to investors has often been suspect, too. In late 2005, for instance, the big accounting firm KPMG sent a cease-and-desist notice to Keydata Investment Services Ltd., a London firm that was using KPMG's name in its marketing material for unrated death bonds without permission. A Keydata official didn't return phone calls seeking comment. A KPMG spokesman says: "We do not endorse or recommend these products."

　　IMPROPER MARKETING is just one of the things that got two California men into trouble. Next March, Curtis D. Somoza and Robert A. Coberly are scheduled to go on trial in federal court in Los Angeles on charges that they bilked dozens of investors out of tens of millions of dollars in a scheme involving an African American church group in Los Angeles called the Personal Involvement Center. The men, whose lawyers declined to comment, raised $69 million for an investment trust called Persistence Capital, which arranged to buy policies from Transamerica Corp. on the lives of some 2,000 members of the inner-city church. The deal was structured so that Persistence would pay for the premiums, while the $275,000 death benefit on each policy would be split three ways: $15,000 to the deceased person's family to cover burial costs, $20,000 to the church group, and the remaining $240,000 to the trust. The trust's haul would go toward paying the premiums on the remaining policies and providing payouts to investors.

　　Somoza and Coberly pitched the deal to the Reverend J. Benjamin Hardwick as an opportunity for the 75-year-old pastor to get a modest death benefit for his mostly poor members and raise funds for the group's charitable works. Somoza and Co-berly sold it to investors as a way to score a high annual return of 25% because the church group's members "were predominantly African Americans and had a higher mortality rate than the average population," according to the indictment. Prosecutors say the pitch reflected inflated return assumptions. Hardwick didn't return several phone calls seeking comment.

　　Soon after the deal was set up, say prosecutors, Coberly and Somoza began looting the trust to buy mansions and sports cars. In September, 2005, a year after Persistence bought the policies from Transamerica, it was forced into bankruptcy by investors demanding their money back. Trying to salvage the scheme, Coberly and Somoza shopped the policies to other investors but could find no buyers. They were arrested in May, 2006, and charged with 27 counts of securities and wire fraud.

　　Coventry First has also been accused of wrongdoing. Last October Eliot Spitzer, in one of his final acts as New York's attorney general, charged the firm with cheating elderly insurance holders. In a civil suit in New York State Court, the now-governor accused Coventry, which buys life settlements and resells them, of making "dozens" of secret payments to brokers as a reward for not seeking competing bids. （The investigation is now overseen by Attorney General Andrew Cuomo.） Coventry CEO Alan Buerger says the lawsuit was based on "a handful of out-of-context e-mails."

　　True or not, the allegations against Coventry sent a shock wave through the life settlement business. Most damagingly, they torpedoed a planned $300 million death bond offering from a partnership formed by Coventry and Ritchie Capital, a hedge fund. The deal, which was to be underwritten by Lehman Brothers Inc （LEH ）., would have been backed by a pool of life insurance policies with a face value of $1.16 billion, by far the largest U.S. death bond offering to date.

　　What's alarming is how far the deal had progressed before blowing up. Investors were cued up and ready to buy. On Oct. 10, 2006, Moody's （MCO ） even tagged the senior notes, which had a face value of $166 million, with a rating of A3, an investment-grade status that would have allowed ordinary mutual funds to pile in. Then the Coventry suit was filed, and Moody's quickly withdrew its rating, citing the "uncertainty surrounding the transaction." Michael N. Adler, a Moody's spokesman, says the firm wasn't aware Coventry was under investigation when it issued the rating. The 10-page report that accompanied the rating is no longer available to the public. In the report, obtained by BusinessWeek, Moody's said it believed that Coventry's "due diligence was adequate for the rating being requested." Jay Eisbruck, a Moody's managing director, stresses that "this is an asset class that we are very careful about."

　　What especially worries regulators are so-called stranger- initiated deals, in which an investor persuades people to take an expensive policy and lends them money for the premium. In the boldest example yet, an investor group pitched a bank on a deal involving all 45,000 residents of St. Kitts and Nevis. The promoters claimed the islands' government was on board. But the deal got a cool reception from Wall Street bankers, who all stress that they perform ample due diligence before buying policies. A government finance official said he had never heard of such a deal.

　　Yet hedge funds and other finance firms have been diving into other stranger-initiated deals in the past two years, wooing seniors into taking out policies by offering cruises and other gifts. Industry sources estimate that $10 billion to $20 billion in such policies have been created since 2004. Some state insurance commissioners have joined with insurers in calling for a crackdown.

　　Amazingly, such problems have merely delayed the emergence of death bonds, not derailed it. G. Andrew Karolyi, a finance professor at Ohio State University's Fischer College of Business who specializes in international markets, says Wall Street's interest is predictable given the "demographic bubble" of aging baby boomers, many of whom will be looking to cash in insurance policies. "For investment banks," he says, "all of this sounds like an opportunity to make money." Tavakoli, the securitization consultant, is more blunt. The idea of death bonds, she says, "creeps me out."

更多 英文美文、英語美文、英文短文、英語短文，請繼續關注 英語作文大全