Before we begin this examination, I would like you to imagine a national coin-flipping contest. Let’s assume we get 225 million Americans up tomorrow morning and we ask them all to wager a dollar. They go out in the morning at sunrise, and they all call the flip of a coin. If they call correctly, they win a dollar from those who called wrong. Each day the losers drop out, and on the subsequent day the stakes build as all previous winnings are put on the line. After ten flips on ten mornings, there will be approximately 220,000 people in the United States who have correctly called ten flips in a row. They each will have won a little over $1,000.

在進行審查之前，我要各位設想一場全國性的擲銅板大賽。假定全美國2.25億的 人口在明天早晨起床時都擲出一枚1美元的銅板。早晨太陽升起時，他們都走到門外 擲銅板，并猜銅板出現的正面或反面。如果猜對了，他們將從猜錯者的手中贏得1美 元。每天輸者被淘汰，獎金則不斷地累積。經過10個早晨的10次投擲之后，全美國 約有2. 2萬人連續10次猜對擲銅板的結果，每人所贏得的獎金約1000多美元。

Now this group will probably start getting a little puffed up about this，human nature being what it is. They may try to be modest, but at cocktail parties they will occasionally admit to attractive members of the opposite sex what their technique is，and what marvelous insights they bring to the field of flipping.

現在，這群人可能會開始炫耀自己的戰績，此乃人的天性使然。他們也許會盡 可能保持謙虛的態度，但在雞尾酒宴會中，他們偶爾會以此技巧吸引異性的注意，并炫耀其投擲銅板的奇異洞察力o

Assuming that the winners are getting the appropriate rewards from the losers, in another ten days we will have 215 people who have successfully called their coin flips 20 times in a row and who, by this exercise, each have turned one dollar into a little over $1 million. $225 million would have been lost，$225 million would have been won.

假定贏家都可以從輸家手中得到適當的獎金，再經過10天，約有215個人連續20 次猜對擲銅板的結果，這些人將贏得大約每人100萬美元的獎金。輸家總共付出2.25 億美元，贏家則得到2.25億美元。

By then, this group will really lose their heads. They will probably write books on “How I turned a Dollar into a Million in Twenty Days Working Thirty Seconds a Morning.” Worse yet, they，ll probably start jetting around the country attending seminars on efficient coin-flipping and tackling skeptical professors with, “ If it can’t be done, why are there 215 of us?”

這時候，這群人可能就會飄飄然地沉迷其中：他們可能開始著書立說：“我如 何每天早晨工作30秒，而在20天之內將1美元變成100萬美元。”更糟的是，他們 會在全國各地參加宣講會，講授如何有效地投擲銅板，并且反駁持懷疑態度的教授 說，“如果這是不可能的事，為什么會有我們這215個人呢？ ”

By then some business school professor will probably be rude enough to bring up the fact that if 225 million orangutans had engaged in a similar exercise, the results would be much the same—215 egotistical orangutans with 20 straight winning flips.

但是，某商學院的教授可能會粗魯地提出一項事實，如果2.25億只猩猩參加這場 大賽，結果大致上也是如此——有215只自大的猩猩將連續贏得20次的投擲。

I would argue, however, that there are some important differences in the examples I am going to present. For one thing, if (a) you had taken 225 million orangutans distributed roughly as the U.S. population is； if (b) 215 winners were left after 20 days; and if (c) you found that 40 came from a particular zoo in Omaha, you would be pretty sure you were on to something. So you would probably go out and ask the zookeeper about what he's feeding them, whether they had special exercises, what books they read, and who knows what else. That is, if you found any really extraordinary concentrations of success, you might want to see if you could identify concentrations of unusual characteristics that might be causal factors.

然而，我必須說明，前述事例和我即將提出的案例之間存在著若干重大差異。 一方面，如果（1)你所選擇的2.25億只猩猩的分布狀況與美國的人口分布大致相 同；如果（2)經過20天的競賽，只剩下215只贏家；如果（3)你發現其中有40只猩猩來自于奧瑪哈的某個動物園，則其中必有溪踐。于是，你會詢問猩猩管理員各種 問題,例如它們吃什么飼料、是否做特殊的運動、閱讀什么書籍……換言之，如果 你發現成功案例有非比尋常的集中現象，則你希望判定此異常的特色是否是成功的 原因。

Scientific inquiry naturally follows such a pattern. If you were trying to analyze possible causes of a rare type of cancer~with, say, 1,500 cases a year in the United States—and you found that 400 of them occurred in some little mining town in Montana, you would get very interested in the water there, or the occupation of those afflicted, or other variables. You know it’s not random chance that 400 come from a small area. You would not necessarily know the causal factors, but you would know where to search.

科學的調查也遵循此一形態。如果你試圖分析某種罕見的癌癥原因。例如，在 每年僅有的1500個癌癥病例中，你發現蒙大拿州的某個礦區小鎮就產生了400個病 例，則你必然對當地的飲水、病患的職業或其他種種變數產生興趣，你推斷在一個 小鎮中發生400個病例絕不是隨機因素所造成。這說明雖然你未必了解病因，但卻知 道從哪里著手調查。

I submit to you that there are ways of defining an origin other than geography. In addition to geographical origins, there can be what I call an intellectual origin. I think you will find that a disproportionate number of successful coin-flippers in the investment world came from a very small intellectual village that could be called Graham-and-Doddsville. A concentration of winners that simply cannot be explained by chance can be traced to this particular intellectual village.

除了地理國家，還有其他方式可以界定起源。除了地理的起源，還有我所謂 “智力的起源”。我認為各位將在投資領域發現，有一個不成比例的現象就是很多 贏家來自一個極小的智力村莊，它可以稱為“格雷厄姆一多德都市”。這個特殊智 力村存在著許多贏家。這種集中現象絕非巧合所能夠解釋。

Conditions could exist that would make even that concentration unimportant. Perhaps 100 people were simply imitating the coin-flipping call of some terribly persuasive personality. When he called heads, 100 followers automatically called that coin the same way. If the leader was part of the 215 left at the end, the fact that 100 came from the same intellectual origin would mean nothing. You would simply be identifying one case as a hundred cases. Similarly, let’s assume that you lived in a strongly patriarchal society and every family in the United States conveniently consisted of ten members. Further assume that the patriarchal culture was so strong that, when the 225 million people went out the first day, every member of the family identified with the father’s call. Now，at the end of the 20-day period, you would have 215 winners, and you would find that they came from only 21,5 families. Some naive types might say that this indicates an enormous hereditary factor as an explanation of successful coin-flipping. But, of course, it would have no significance at all because it would simply mean that you didn’t have 215 individual winners, but rather 21.5 randomly distributed families who were winners.

在某些情況下，即使非比尋常的集中現象也可能不重要。或許有100個只是模仿 某一位極具說服力的領導者，而依其主張來猜測銅板的投擲結果。當這位領導者猜 正面，10(Kh追隨者也會自動地作相同的猜測。如果這一位領導者是屬于最后215位 贏家之一，則推斷這100也便屬于同一個智力起源是沒有任何意義的，因為這100個 案例實際上只代表一個案例。同理，假定你生活在美國一個父權結構極為嚴密的社 會，而每一個家庭里的10個成員都恰好以父親馬首是瞻。20天之后，你將發現215位 羸家是來自于21.5個家庭。若干天真的分析師可能因此而認為，遺傳因素在成功猜測 銅板投擲結果中占有巨大作用。當然，這實際上不具有任何意義，因為你所擁有的 不是215位個別贏家，而只是21.5個隨機分布的家庭。

In this group of successful investors that I want to consider, there has been a common intellectual patriarch, Ben Graham. But the children who left the house of this intellectual patriarch have called their “flips” in very different ways. They have gone to different places and bought and sold different stocks and companies, yet they have had a combined record that simply cannot be explained by the fact that they are all calling flips identically because a leader is signaling the calls for them to make. The patriarch has merely set forth the intellectual theory for making coin-calling decisions, but each student has decided on his own manner of applying the theory.

我所要考慮的這一群成功投資者，共有一位共同的智力族長——本格雷厄 姆。但是，這些離開此智力家族的孩童卻用不同方法猜測自己的“銅板”。他們各 自前往不同的地方，買賣不同的股票和企業，但他們的綜合績效絕對無法用隨機因素加以解釋。他們作相同的猜測，只是因為領導者下達某一項指令，因此也無法用 這種方式解釋他們的表現。族長只提供了猜測銅板的智力理論，每位學生都必須自 行決定如何運用這項理論。

The common intellectual theme of the investors from Graham-and-Doddsville is this： they search for discrepancies between the value of a business and the price of small pieces of that business in the market. Essentially, they exploit those discrepancies without the efficient market theorist’s concern as to whether the stocks are bought on Monday or Thursday, or whether it is January or July, etc. Incidentally, when businessmen buy businesses, which is just what our Graham & Dodd investors are doing through the purchase of marketable stocks-I doubt that many are cranking into their purchase decision the day of the week or the month in which the transaction is going to occur. If it doesn’t make any difference whether all of a business is being bought on a Monday or a Friday, I am baffled why academicians invest extensive time and effort to see whether it makes a difference when buying small pieces of those same businesses. Our Graham dc Dodd investors, needless to say， do not discuss beta, the capital asset pricing model, or covariance in returns among securities. These are not subjects of any interest to them. In fact, most of them would have difficulty defining those terms. The investors simply focus on two variables: price and value.

來自“格雷厄姆一多德都市”的投資者所具備的共同智力結構是：他們探索企 業的價值與該企業市場價格之間的差異。事實上，他們利用其間”差異，忽略了效 率市場理論家所關心的問題：股票究竟在星期一買進還是在星期四買進，是在1月份 買進抑或是在7月份買進……。當企業家買進某家公司時這正是格雷厄姆一多德 都市的投資者透過上市股票所從事的行為——我懷疑有多少人會在意交易必須發生于 某個月份或某個星期的某一天。如果企業的買進交易發生在星期一或星期五沒有任何 差別，則我無法了解學術界人士為何要花費大量的時間和精力，探討代表該企業部分 股權的交易發生時的差異。毋庸多說，格雷厄姆一多德都市的投資者并不探討資本 資產定價模型、證券投資報酬本的變異數，因為這些都不是他們所關心的議題。事實上，他們大多數難以界定上述學術名詞。他們只在乎兩項實數：價格與價值。

I always find it extraordinary that so many studies are made of price and volume behavior，the stuff of chartists. Can you imagine buying an entire business simply because the price of the business had been marked up substantially last week and the week before? Of course, the reason a lot of studies are made of these price and volume variables is that now, in the age of computers，there are almost endless data available about them. It isn’t necessarily because such studies have any utility; it’s simply that the data are there and academicians have [worked] hard to learn the mathematical skills needed to manipulate them. Once these skills are acquired, it seems sinful not to use them, even if the usage has no utility or negative utility. As a friend said, to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

我始終對分析師對價量行為所作的大量研究感到驚訝。你是否會僅僅因為某 家公司的市場價格在本周或前一周劇揚，便決定購買該企業呢？在日前電腦化的時 代，人們之所以會大量研究價格與成交量的行為，理由是這兩項變數擁有了無數的 資料。研究未必是因為其具任何功用；而只是因為資料既然存在，學術界人士便必 須努力學習操作這些資料所需要的數學技巧。一旦掌握這些技巧，不去運用就會給 他們帶來罪惡感，即使這些技巧的運用沒有任何功用，或只會帶來負面功用，他們 也在所不惜。如同一位朋友所說的，對一位持鐵錘的人來說，每一樣事看起來都像 是釘子。

I think the group that we have identified by a common intellectual home is worthy of study. Incidentally, despite all the academic studies of the influence of such variables as price, volume, seasonality, capitalization size, etc., upon stock performance, no interest has been evidenced in studying the methods of this unusual concentration of value-oriented winners.

我認為，這一群具有共同智力起源的投資者非常值得我們研究。雖然學術界對 價格、成交量、季節性、資本規模、對股票績效的影響以及其他變數的研究不斷地 增加，但這群以價值為導向贏家的方法卻毫不受人關心。

I begin this study of results by going back to a group of four of us who worked at Graham-Newman Corporation from 1954 through 1956. There were only four— I have not selected these names from among thousands. I offered to go to work at Graham-Newman for nothing after I took Ben Graham’s class, but he turned me down as overvalued. He took this value stuff very seriously After much pestering he finally hired me. There were three partners and four of us as the “peasant” level. All four left between 1955 and 1957 when the firm was wound up，and it's possible to trace the record of three.

關于這一項績效的研究，我首先要追溯到從1954年到1956年間工作于Greham— Newman公司的四位伙伴。我們總共四個人——我并不是從數以千計的對象中挑選這四個人。在我選修本格雷厄姆的課程之后，我要求進人Graham—Newman公司，雖 別無他求，但格雷厄姆卻以價值高估而拒絕了我的要求。他對價值看得非常嚴重！ 經我不斷地懇求，他最后答應雇我。當時公司有三位合伙股東，以及我們四位“學 徒”。公司結束經營之后，我們四個人陸續在1955年到1957年間離開公司，目前只 能夠追蹤其中三個人的記錄。

The first example is that of Walter Schloss. Walter never went to college, but took a course from Ben Graham at night at the New York Institute of Finance. Walter left Graham-Newman in 1955 and achieved the record shown here over 28 years. Here is what “Adam Smith”一after I told him about Walter~wrote about him in Supermoney (1972).

第一個案例是華特史洛斯。華特從來沒有念過大學，但他在紐約金融協會參 加了本杰明葛雷厄姆的夜間課程。華特在1955年離開Greham—Newman公司。以 下是“亞當史密斯”——在我和他談論有關華特的事跡之后——在《超級金錢》(Supermoney, 1972年）一書中對他所作的描述：

He has no connections or access to useful information. Practically no one in Wall Street knows him and he is not fed any ideas. He looks up the numbers in the manuals and sends for the annual reports, and that’s about it.

他從來不接觸或運用有用的資訊。在華爾街幾乎沒有人認識他，所以沒有人提 供他有關投資的觀念。他只參考手冊上的數字,并要求企業寄年報給他，情況便是 如此。

In introducing me to (Schloss) Warren had also, to my mind, described himself. “He never forgets that he is handling other people’s money, and this reinforces his normal strong aversion to loss.” He has total integrity and a realistic picture of himself. Money is real to him and stocks are real—and from this flows an attraction to the “margin of safety” principle.

當華特介紹我們認識時，我記得他曾這樣描述過：“他從來沒有忘記自己是在 管理別人的資金，這進一步強化了他對于風險的厭惡。”他有高尚的品格，并以務 實的態度自持。對他來說，金錢是真實的，股票也真實的——并從此而接受了 “安全邊際”的原則。

I'm convinced that there is much inefficiency in the market. These Graham-and-Doddsville investors have successfully exploited gaps between price and value. When the price of a stock can be influenced by a “herd” on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are frequently nonsensical.

我相信市場上存在著許多沒有效率的現象。這些來自于“格雷厄姆一多德都 市”的投資人成功地掌握了價格與價值之間的缺口。華爾街的“群眾”可以影響股 票價格，當最情緒化的人、最貪婪的或最沮喪的人肆意驅動股價時，我們很難辯稱 市場價格是理性的產物。事實上，市場經常是不合理的。

I would like to say one important thing about risk and reward. Sometimes risk and reward are correlated in a positive fashion. If someone were to say to me, “I have here a six-shooter and I have slipped one cartridge into it. Why don’t you just spin it and pull it once? If you survive, I will give you $1 million.” I would decline—perhaps stating that $1 million is not enough. Then he might offer me $5 million to pull the trigger twice—now that would be a positive correlation between risk and reward.

我想提出有關報酬與風險之間的重要關系。有時報酬與風險之間成正比。如果 有人告訴我“我有一支六發彈裝的左輪槍，并且填裝一發子彈。你可以任意地撥動 轉輪，然后朝自己扣一次扳機。如果你能夠逃過一功，我就賞你100萬美元。”我將 會拒絕這項提議——或許我的理由是100萬美元太少了。然后，他可能建議將獎金提 高為500萬美元，但必須扣兩次扳機——這便是報酬與風險之間成正比！

The exact opposite is true with value investing. If you buy a dollar bill for 60 cents, it's riskier than if you buy a dollar bill for 40 cents, but the expectation of reward is greater in the latter case. The greater the potential for reward in the value portfolio, the less risk there is.

在價值投資法當中，情況恰巧相反。如果你以60美分買進1美元的紙鈔，其風險 大于以40美分買進1美元的紙鈔，但后者報酬的期望值卻比較高。以價值為導向的投 資組合，報酬潛力愈高風險愈低。

One quick example. The Washington Post Company in 1973 was selling for $80 million in the market. At the time, that day, you could have sold the assets to any one of ten buyers for not less than $400 million，probably appreciably more. The company owned the Post，Newsweek，plus several television stations in major markets. Those same properties are worth $2 billion now, so the person who would have paid $400 million would not have been crazy.

我可以舉一個簡單的例子：在1973年，華盛頓郵報公司的總市值為8000萬美元。在這一天，你可以將其資產以4億美元甚至更高的價格賣給10個買家中的任意一 個。該公司擁有華盛頓郵報、商業周刊以及數家重要的電視臺。這些資產目前的價 值為4乙美元，因此愿意支付4億美元的買家并非瘋子。

Now, if the stock had declined even further to a price that made the valuation $40 million instead of $80 million, its beta would have been greater. And to people that think beta measures risk, the cheaper price would have made it look riskier. This is truly Alice in Wonderland. I have never been able to figure out why it's riskier to buy $400 million worth of properties for $40 million than $80 million. And, as a matter of fact, if you buy a group of such securities and you know anything at all about business valuation, there is essentially no risk in buying $400 million for $80 million, particularly if you do it by buying ten $40 million piles of $8 million each. Since you don’t have your hands on the $400 million, you want to be sure you are in with honest and reasonably competent people, but that’s not a difficult job.

現在，如果股價繼續下跌，該企業的市值從8000萬美元跌到4000萬美元，其變 數值也上升。對于用變數值衡量風險的人來說，更低的價格使它更具有風險。這真 是仙境中的愛麗絲。我永遠無法了解，用4000萬美元，而非8000萬美元購買價值4億 美元的資產，其風險竟然更高。事實上，如果你買進一堆這樣的證券，而且稍微了 解所謂的企業評價，用8000萬購買4億元的資產基本沒有風險，尤其是分別以800萬 美元的價格買進10種價值4000萬美元的資產，其風險更低。因為你不擁有4億美元， 所以你希望能夠確實找到誠實而有能力的人，這并不困難。

You also have to have the knowledge to enable you to make a very general estimate about the value of the underlying businesses. But you do not cut it close. That is what Ben Graham meant by having a margin of safety. You don’t try and buy businesses worth $83 million for $80 million. You leave yourself an enormous margin. When you build a bridge, you insist it can carry 30,000 pounds, but you only drive 10,000 pound trucks across it. And that same principle works in investing.

另外，你必須有知識，而且能夠粗略地估計企業的價值。但是，你不需要精 密的評價知識。這便是本杰明葛拉厄姆所謂的安全邊際。你不必試圖以8000萬美 元的價格購買價值8300萬美元的企業，因為適當的緩沖是必要的。這就如同架設橋 梁，你堅持載重量為3萬磅，但你只準許1萬磅的卡車穿梭其間。相同的原則也適用于投資領域。

In conclusion, some of the more commercially minded among you may wonder why I am writing this article. Adding many converts to the value approach will perforce narrow the spreads between price and value. I can only tell you that the secret has been out for 50 years, ever since Ben Graham and Dave Dodd wrote Security Analysis，yet I have seen no trend toward value investing in the 35 years that Fve practiced it. There seems to be some perverse human characteristic that likes to make easy things difficult. The academic world, if anything, has actually backed away from the teaching of value investing over the last 30 years. It's likely to continue that way. Ships will sail around the world but the Flat Earth Society will flourish. There will continue to be wide discrepancies between price and value in the marketplace, and those who read their Graham & Dodd will continue to prosper.
 

總而言之，有些具備商業頭腦的人可能會懷疑我撰寫本文的動機：更多人皈依 價值投資法，將會縮小價值與價格之間的差距。我只能夠如此告訴各位，自從本杰 明格雷厄姆與大衛多德出版《證券分析》，這個秘密已經流傳了50年，在我奉 行這項投資理論的35年中，我不曾目睹價值投資法蔚然成風。偏執似乎是人的天性 的特點之一，因為人們喜歡把簡單的事情弄得更復雜。最近30年來，學術界如果有 任何作為的話，乃完全背離了價值投資的教訓，而它很可能繼續如此。船只將環繞 地球而行，但地平之說仍會暢行無阻。在市場上，價格與價值之間還會存在著寬廣 的差值，而奉行格雷厄姆與多德理論的人也會繁榮不絕。
 

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